Are the Europeans indeed, as they think, the ' 
Introduction
Europeans living in the European Union have a clear conscience when they think about the United Nations. European peoples and governments alike are convinced of their 'UN virtuousness'. In comparison with the United States, China and Russia, Europeans view themselves as the 'better peoples of the United Nations'. The US-led Iraq war of 2003 strongly reinforced this self-perception. The banners of the anti-war mass demonstrations in Rome, London, Berlin, Athens and Reykjavik explicitly referred to the United Nations and the Charter rules of international law.
1 Leading European intellectuals, including Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, insisted that the cosmopolitan order described and prescribed in the UN Charter should be defended against competing designs. 'On the international level and in the framework of the United Nations, Europe must bring all its influence to bear in order to balance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States', wrote Derrida and Habermas in May 2003. 2 Europeans, it seemed, rallied around a UN that had been abandoned by the United States; in an exchange of roles, Europe had become the strongest supporter of an organization which, following World War II, the US had set up without substantial European input.
While this flattering European self-image must be questioned, and will be questioned in this article, it is true that Europeans today strongly relate to the ideals of the United Nations. A large majority of Europeans subscribe to the content of the preamble of the UN Charter, even if they do not know the exact text. After the devastating experience of World War II, nationalism, militarism and imperialism had lost all their credibility in Europe, and the Charter vision of a peaceful and just world was accepted as a meaningful and plausible alternative. Later, the success story of (Western) European integration intensified this view and attitude. If 'integration through law' had worked so well in Europe, why should not a similar mechanism succeed on a global level? The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe expresses this thought by saying that 'the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement'. 3 The EC/EU experience has surely contributed to a European attitude of honest 'institutional loyalty' to the United Nations. 4 After the end of the Cold War, a moment of Realpolitik has strengthened this European appreciation of the UN: in the face of the overwhelming military power of the United States, and the American claim to a 'sphere of influence' congruent with the entire world, the UN is upheld as the principal symbol of a multi-polar international system based on the rule of sovereign equality and non-intervention. 5 'We need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism', the Security Strategy presented by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to the The present article can only shed light on a few selected issues in the general theme of 'Europe's practice and the United Nations'. This selection and my observations are necessarily personal -in other words, I make no claim to objectivity or comprehensiveness.
Europe's Marginal Role in the Foundation of the United Nations
While the ideas and ideals characteristic of the UN Charter -with the leitmotif of the 'dignity and worth of the human person' -all have European roots, Europe's role in setting up the United Nations Organization was very limited. One may say that the Europe of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution contributed much more to the establishment of the UN than did the Europe of 1945 and the years leading up it. The only state which influenced to some degree the (ultimately decisive) plans of the Roosevelt Administration for a post-war organization was the United Kingdom, America's closest ally in World War II. Alone, i.e. without the United States, the European states not only would have been unable to establish a new world organization, but they probably would not have even tried. Shattered by the storms of the war, the Western European countries were preoccupied with their own political, economic and societal reconstruction, a situation shared by the European states behind what was soon to be called the Iron Curtain. In addition, the Eastern European states lacked the power to exercise any choice or make foreign policy decisions without constraint imposed by the Soviet Union.
But even if their political and economic resources had allowed the European states substantially to contribute to the establishment of a political world organization in 1945 or the following years, it is unlikely that they would have taken such an initiative. All creative thinking in Western Europe about international relations was directed towards the creation of a closer economic and political union of the European states. It was such a functional integration which, replacing the traditional balance of power schemes, was intended to ensure friendly relations and peace in Europe in the future. This political thinking is captured in the preamble of the 1951 Treaty of Paris Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community:
The Heads of Government and State, . . . Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it, . . . Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts, and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared, Have decided to create a European Coal and Steel Community . . . As far as international relations on a universal level were concerned, the political and legal imagination did not reach beyond what, at the insistence of the Wilson Administration, had been realized after World War I in the form of the League of Nations. Of the European states as they existed in 1945, it was in fact only the United Kingdom which could be expected to support a continuation of the Leaguean organization on which it had exercised a strong influence, and which had enjoyed the ardent support of the British public up to the League's failure to protect Ethiopia against the Italian aggression. 13 The British Government realized, however, that even before the outbreak of World War II, the name of the League of Nations had been discredited beyond repair by its inability to bring into effect the concept of collective security in favour of China, Ethiopia, Spain and Czechoslavakia, the victims of aggression of the 1930s. 'The League defeated' 14 -this was the prevalent perception in 1945, and none of the European governments thought it wise to commit themselves to promoting a similar project. It was essentially the American Government whose plans for a United Nations Organization forced Europe to face the problem of world peace and reminded Europe of its responsibilities for the world at large.
While the British Foreign Office adapted its ideas regarding a post-war world organization 15 to the plans of the Roosevelt Administration, Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed in the idea of regionalism which, in particular, would promote the creation of a 'United States of Europe'. Already in October 1942, when his Foreign Secretary asked him for his views on a post-war organization based upon the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, Churchill reacted hesitantly. 'It sounds very simple', he said, 'to pick out these four Big Powers. We cannot, however, tell what sort of a Russia and what kind of Russian demands we shall have to face'. His own hope for the post-war world, Churchill told Eden, was for a 'United States of Europe' that would not include Russia and in which the barriers between the European nations 'will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible'. 16 In addition to such a united Europe, Churchill regarded as principal world regions the US, the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Soviet Union, South America, Asia and Africa. When he later wrote his wartime memoirs, he maintained that the world organization should have been built on a regional basis. 18 Similarly, 'Europe' barely existed, and could barely be discovered, in the United Nations founded in 1945. All through the period of the Cold War and until the great turning point of 1990, Europe's existence in the UN was a fragmented one. Europe, broken into separate parts, appeared only in pieces, none of which could claim to represent Europe as a whole.
The most important divide was that between East and West. This antagonism made it impossible even to address the division of Europe in the UN. Having been made part and parcel of the Communist bloc ruled by the Soviet Union, the states of Eastern Europe were not only excluded from the process of integration in Western Europe, but also prevented from associating themselves, in the UN, with the Western European countries. In all important matters, they followed the course set by the USSR. This division was reflected in the system of regional groups in the UN, with a Group of Western European and Other States (WEOG) standing opposite a Group of Eastern European States (EES). Redefined in the course of the enlargement of the Security Council in 1963, 19 the two groups are still in existence today, along with the Group of African States, the Group of Asian States, and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States. 20 In the framework of a policy of détente, the so-called Helsinki process, launched by the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1972 Europe ( -1975 , brought about a certain rapprochement of East and West which, however, was not reflected very much in the positions taken by the respective blocs in the UN, with the exception of the area of disarmament.
While the Eastern European countries thus constituted an essentially homogeneous group in the UN, there were further divisions between the states of Western Europe. Firstly, the United Kingdom and France stood out as permanent members of the Security Council and as nuclear powers. In those capacities, they generally pursued their respective national interests and often aligned themselves with the United States, emphasizing their role and rank as 'great powers'. Secondly, the European member states of NATO were separated from the non-aligned states -Austria, Sweden and Finland. Within NATO, France played a special role after it had discontinued its military integration in 1966. Thirdly, with the gradual intensification of their economic and political integration, the member states of the European Economic Community founded in 1957 (since 1992 European Community) increasingly set themselves apart from the non-EEC member states, a significant number of which organized However, this division between EEC members and non-members was mitigated by the successive accession of states to the EEC in 1973 (Denmark, Ireland, UK), 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Portugal and Spain).
Lastly, it must be mentioned that the Federal Republic of Germany only became a member of the UN in 1973. It joined the world organization together with East Germany after the two German states had found a modus vivendi which was supported by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. The Federal Republic had, however, been a member of all UN specialized agencies since 1955 so that its status in the UN had often been described as that of an 'active non-member state'. It follows from the fragmented nature of Europe's appearance in the UN that the question of 'Europe's' compliance with the rules of the UN Charter can only be answered on a state-by-state and subject-by-subject area basis. Furthermore, compliance means different things in the case of prohibitive norms on the one hand, such as the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, and norms requesting positive action on the other hand, like the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means or the obligation to promote and encourage respect for human rights. It is yet another issue whether and to what extent a state has cultivated friendly relations with the United Nations and supported the Organization in ways not specifically called for by the Charter. In order to at least come close to a general picture of European compliance with the Charter rules, I can only single out some matters I consider particularly important or characteristic. other. Given the structure of military alliances and the technological development of weapons since the end of World War II, it is only the two mentioned nuclear powers that during the time of the Cold War were in fact in a position unilaterally to use force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. All the other European states, including Germany and Italy, lacked the political and military means of autonomously waging war or even engaging in small-scale military interventions abroad. For that reason praising the peaceful behaviour of the respective European states since 1945 amounts to honouring a land-locked African state for not having polluted the Atlantic Ocean with waste water. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the experience of the devastation of the World War II led the European nations and their governments to honestly condemn war as a mode of interstate relations. While pacifism in Europe was perhaps never as strong as it was in post-war Japan, it was surely strong enough to deter any European government from even considering going to war against another country in Europe.
A The Prohibition of the Use of Force
It is in line with the actual development of military capacities that the United Kingdom and France were more tempted to use military force contrary to the Charter rules in the first two decades of the UN's existence than in later times. In retrospect, the British and French military intervention in Egypt in 1956 in the aftermath of the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal stands out as one of the last major autonomous military actions of the two colonial powers -autonomous meaning that they were not coordinated with and approved by the United States. 25 Later the United Kingdom and France either supported action taken by the United States or their interventions were openly or tacitly approved of by the US. This way, in the last analysis the issue of British and French compliance with the prohibition of the use of force had become an issue of (indirect) American compliance. France forcefully intervened many times in its former African colonies. The veto power of all three states shielded Britain and France from a condemnation of their interventions by the Security Council.
Along with the United States, the European member states of NATO engaged in aerial warfare against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. This is not the place to recount once more the events 26 or to examine the legality of the NATO states' action. 27 Suffice it to say that with the Kosovo intervention the Europeans lost their post-WW II virginity (or post-Cold War virginity, respectively) with regard to the use of force. Since the UN Charter does not provide for a humanitarian intervention as an exception to the rule of the general ban on the use of force, and the Security Council remained silent, neither approving nor condemning the intervention, NATO's war was highly questionable from a legal point of view, whatever political or humanitarian considerations may have supported it. It is fair to say, I believe, that their participation in the Kosovo intervention prevented the European states from opposing the US-British war against Iraq of 2003 with legal reasons as strongly as they otherwise could have done. Having sidelined the UN security system, if not outrightly breaching the UN Charter, in the Kosovo case, the European states which disapproved of the war against Iraq, particularly France and Germany, could no longer claim that elevated position of high-principled allegiance to the law from which it is easy to condemn the faults of others. Nevertheless, the position of the European governments opposing the war, including the Russian Government, was decisive for the Security Council's refusal to support the American-British war policy in the winter of 2003, allowing the war to be recognized as what it substantially would have been in any case -an exercise in US unilateralism and hegemonism. 28 As regards the 'war against terrorism' proclaimed by the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, a so-called war raising many legal questions, the position of Europe is ambivalent. Leaving aside the British Government, which has chosen the role of a close ally of the United States, most European states have moved from an initially strong support of the American policy, born of a sincere sense of solidarity, to a mixture of general support and hesitant critique. The European states backed up the US military intervention in Afghanistan and endorsed the various measures of the Security Council, including those directed against private persons suspected of financing terrorist acts. 29 They only cautiously criticized the so-called Bush doctrine, 30 which claims that the United States is entitled to a pre-emptive use of force against any threat to US national security -a doctrine which cannot be reconciled with the rules of the UN Charter on self-defence. The European states basically kept silent about the problematical reinterpretation of the right of self-defence as a right arising not only in the case of a state-authored use of force but also if force is used by 'private' groups, in particular terrorist organizations, and is not attributable to a state. Lastly, the European governments did not openly and unequivocally find fault with the American treatment of supposed Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and detained in Guantanamo Bay and other military prisons and secret places maintained by the CIA and possibly other US intelligence services. The European governments only half-heartedly called for a more central role of the United Nations in the fight against global terrorism. They did little to use the potential of the UN as an impartial coordinator of that fight and instead resigned, in an attitude of Realpolitik, before what they regarded as the inevitable -namely the politics of unilateralism adopted by the United States. 
B The Obligation of States to Settle Their Disputes by Peaceful Means
As Member States of the UN, the European states have accepted not only the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, an obligation they by and large have met since 1945, but also the duty to settle their disputes by peaceful means (Articles 2(3) and 33(1) of the UN Charter). This duty was fulfilled in an impressive effort to bridge the East-West divide in the Helsinki process, with the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975 31 and the series of concluding documents emerging from follow-up meetings. A part of the Final Act, the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, while the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament sought to eliminate the causes of tension existing among the participating states. In the framework of the Helsinki process, the Entspannungspolitik of the German Government led by Chancellor Willy Brandt solved one of the most urgent territorial conflicts which had arisen as a result of World War II, namely the question of Germany's Eastern borders. The respective treaties of the 1970s between Germany on the one hand and Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on the other were confirmed after the German reunification. Today, the few territorial conflicts still existing in Europe are those between some Eastern and South Eastern European countries (especially in the Caucasus and the Balkans), with the notable exceptions of the questions of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. For the mutual relations of its Member States, the European Union provides for a dense network of rules and procedures guaranteeing a peaceful settlement of disputes of a political or economic nature.
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In that context, one may also consider the willingness of European states to recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the A comprehensive analysis of the degree to which human rights have been protected in Europe would go beyond the limits of this presentation. As regards the compliance of the European states with the human rights norms stated in the ECHR and its additional protocols, one can rest one's opinion on the case law of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights. The work of expert bodies, both on a European and a universal level, responsible for complaint procedures and fact-finding, 37 must also be taken into account. Reports of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and independent NGOs like Amnesty International can complete the picture.
As Christian Tomuschat observed, 'Western Europe cannot boast a stainless record, notwithstanding the generally favourable conditions which have surrounded its rebirth after the Second World War.' 38 An area of particular and growing concern is that of the protection of the rights of persons seeking refugee status in the European Union. The paper by Professor Geoff Gilbert in this symposium examines the question See ibid. at 320. of whether Europe is living up to its obligations to refugees. 39 It is not coincidental that in January 2004 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made the problems of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants the focus of his address to the European Parliament. 'The [European] public', the Secretary-General said, 'has been fed images of a flood of unwelcome entrants, and of threats to their societies and identities. In the process, immigrants have sometimes been stigmatized, vilified, even de-humanized'. 40 In the 'fight against terrorism' European states have introduced a number of limitations of human rights, especially of the right to privacy, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly. In many ways, measures of surveillance by the police and secret services have been made easier. Modern means of communication (telephone, mobile phones, e-mail, computer networks) give the authorities access to information about private behaviour to an extent inconceivable only 20 years ago. As a result, the old police dream of the 'transparent citizen' has largely come true. Individuals suspected of having committed acts of terrorism have been deprived of established rights of the prosecuted. Guarantees of fair trial have been limited. It is obvious that governments have taken advantage of the widespread fear of the general population after the attacks of September 11 to push through legislatory changes which they had long considered desirable. Professor Colin Warbrick addresses these questions more closely in this symposium. 41 I also wish to refer the reader to papers delivered at a conference of the Max-PlanckInstitute in Heidelberg in January 2003. 42 Hopefully, these recent policies will not jeopardize in the long term the high standards of human rights protection achieved in Europe since the end of World War II, in conformity with the law of the United Nations.
D Decolonization and Economic Cooperation with Developing Countries
Until the time at which the European colonial empires in Africa and Asia had basically been dissolved, that is by the mid-1970s, colonialism was a major contentious issue in the relationship between the United Nations and the European colonial powers, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and The Netherlands. Although the UN Charter proclaimed the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Articles 1(2) and 55) and obliged the colonial powers to develop self-government of the peoples of non-self-governing territories and to assist them in the progressive development of free political institutions (Article 73 the colonies into independence. 43 However, with more and more former colonies joining the UN, the General Assembly increasingly made decolonization a focal point of its activities. In 1960, it adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 44 demanding, inter alia, that 'immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, . . . in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom'. Eighty-nine states voted in favour of the Declaration; there were no votes against but nine abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States). Even if it took another 15 years before the most important post-World War II phase of decolonization came to an end, the European colonial powers eventually yielded to the demands of the General Assembly. It is telling that at the time that the so-called Friendly Relations Declaration was passed (1970) they had already given up their resistance.
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Today only a few territories, most of them small islands, are left on the agenda of the General Assembly. 'We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person . . . and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom' -remembering these still impressive and moving opening words of the UN Charter, it is debatable whether the European states, and in particular the former colonial powers, have cared about Africa the way they should have, whether they have responsibly, determinedly and patiently striven against war and violence, poverty and the suppression of human rights in Africa. Because of the history of colonization, the respective responsibility of Europe for the well-being of the African peoples has been greater, and continues to be greater, than that of any other non-African region of the world. A recent survey of the work of the Security Council concluded that since the early 1990s the Council 'spends the majority of its time on African issues, but frequently with little success'. 'Whatever the sources of its very mixed (at best) track record in Africa, unless the Council can do better in years to come, it will clearly be failing the globe's most challenged continent and the intent of the Charter.'
49 Indeed, the Security Council must do better, and so must the European states as members of the Council.
E The European Contribution to the UN Budget and to UN Peacekeeping Operations
As far as the general support of the European states for the United Nations and the achievement of its purposes is concerned, I single out only two matters. See The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 3. The EC budget provides some €300 million per year for UN agencies, in particular for development and humanitarian assistance. substantial, 52 the European contributions of personnel (military observers, civilian police and troops) have been modest. The greatest burden continues to be borne by a core group of developing countries. As of June 2004, the 15 main troop-contributing countries were Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Morocco, Ukraine, Brazil and Senegal. 53 Only about 10 per cent of the troops and civilian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions came from the EU and one per cent from the United States. 54 Of the EU states, the largest contributions are presently made by Poland (741), the United Kingdom (541), France (540), Austria (422), Slovakia (398), Sweden (311), Germany (296) and Finland (225). 55 The contributions of most EU states remain below 50 persons. 56 (In comparison, Pakistan contributes 8,159 persons, Bangladesh 6,177, and Nigeria 3,565.)
F The Use of the Right of Veto in the Security Council by European States
Lastly, I briefly wish to address the use of the right of veto in the Security Council. Since Article 27(3) of the UN Charter provides for the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, its use cannot generally be said to violate the Charter or to run contrary to its purposes. 57 It is only in highly exceptional cases that one can speak of an abuse of the veto power. Nevertheless, a veto cast by a permanent member is generally motivated by what that member deems its national interests. Therefore, the frequency of vetoes exercised by a state can serve to indicate that state's readiness to agree to mutual concessions and compromises in the interest of the international community as defined by the UN Charter. has the UK or France prevented the adoption of a draft resolution by its own veto alone. In the years 1970 to 1973 the UK vetoed several draft resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia, and in 1976 France opposed a draft resolution concerning the situation in the Comoros. In 1956, the UK and France vetoed two draft resolutions in the Suez Canal crisis. From this survey it appears that most vetoes cast by the UK and France on their own initiative had to do with the colonial heritage of the two states. In a number of cases, however, the two European powers did not have to use their veto power, knowing that the United States would prevent the draft resolution in question from being adopted. In particular, the United States could be relied upon to defend the 'common interest' of the West against the Soviet Union in the struggles of the 'Cold War'. Evaluating the veto practice of the individual permanent members, one must also take into consideration the fact that until the early 1960s the Western powers almost invariably managed to muster the required majority to defeat unwelcome draft resolutions without resorting to the veto.
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G Concluding Remarks on the Issue of Compliance
In conclusion, it may be said that those European states which were masters of their own fate have been loyal members of the United Nations and have generally observed the rules of the Charter. There is a broad agreement between their own constitutional values and the purposes and principles of the Charter. In contrast, the Eastern European states were forced to follow the lead of the Soviet Union until 1990. Important human rights and fundamental freedoms were systematically violated in Eastern Europe.
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As soon as they were free from foreign domination, the Eastern European states joined their Western counterparts in their recognition of the rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights.
The Western European states generally adhered to the UN Charter, including its prohibition of the use of force in international relations. However, compliance with that prohibition was not too much of an achievement since the states, firmly integrated in NATO and connected with the United States, were not in a position independently to use military force against any other state. The United Kingdom and France played a special role as principal victorious powers of the Second World War and colonial powers. Slowly and involuntarily retreating from their status as world powers, they were sometimes tempted to take action conflicting with the Charter rules. On the other hand, their history, global links, and diplomatic and military capacities enabled the UK und France often to serve the United Nations in ways not open to other European countries. Both states continue to play a special role as nuclear powers and permanent members of the Security Council. Britain still cultivates a 'special relationship' with the United States, a policy which has often separated it from the rest of Europe. According to Article 11(1) of the TEU, 'the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policies'. Among the objectives of the CFSP, the following are mentioned first: 'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter'. 62 The UN Charter is explicitly referred to once more in the same article when it proclaims as further objectives of the CFSP 'to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders'.
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The other stated objectives of the CFSP ('to promote international cooperation', 'to develop and consolidate . . . respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms') also correspond to those of the United Nations.
Article 19 of the TEU deals with the CFSP in international organizations, including the UN, in the following terms:
1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums.
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. This provision says that the so-called joint actions adopted by the EU Council shall be binding on the member states.
In the UN, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy mainly finds expression in three different fora -the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the specialized agencies. Here, I shall only deal with the first two.
In the General Assembly, joint declarations of the EU Member States, delivered by the current EU Presidency, 65 have become common. In the second half of 2001, Belgium, for instance, made 97 declarations on behalf of the then 15 EU Member States. 66 Often, the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the EFTA member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, formally aligned themselves with these declarations. 67 Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the Presidency will thus usually speak for almost 30 UN Member States, which gives the EU a strong influence on the deliberations of the General Assembly. However, this EU coordination has been largely reactive in the sense that common positions have been developed with regard to initiatives taken by other states and groups of states; only rarely have UN-related initiatives actually been devised in the CFSP procedures. 68 The difficult and time-consuming proceedings in which the EU states endeavour to coordinate and harmonize their UN policies in Brussels and New York entail a moment of inflexibility -once a common position has been adopted it can hardly be changed in the course of subsequent negotiations with other UN Member States, especially the other members of the Group of Western European and Other States (WEOG). The standard formula developed for that alignment was: 'Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union -Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the Associated Countries -Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the EFTA Countries of the European Economic Area -Iceland and Liechtenstein, align themselves with this statement.' 68 See Sucharipa, supra note 9, at 777. See also The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 4: '[T]oo often, the EU is still content to play a reactive role. Taking a more proactive stance would involve more extensive dialogue and preparatory work with other countries and groups.' By way of example, see the 'EU Priorities for the 58th General Assembly' of 1 July 2003, available at http:// www.europa-eu-un.org/.
69
See also The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 21: 'The Presidency (or other EU representatives) should be given greater flexibility to promote EU positions effectively in UN forums, on the basis of agreed mandates or guidelines, rather than on the basis of detailed EU statements. . . . [This] would help the EU to become a more active and operational participant in UN discussions.' For WEOG, see infra text accompanying note 82.
In comparison with the UN policy of the United States, some characteristics of the positions adopted by the EU states can be identified:
70 EU states are more willing to accept certain restrictions of their sovereignty (human rights, death penalty, International Criminal Court) and insist more strongly on peaceful forms of settling international disputes. The European approach is more 'legalistic' than the American, placing trust in the importance and efficiency of international law. In general, the EU has been more skilful in negotiations with the G-77, for whose wishes and concerns it has often shown more sympathy than the US. As far as it can agree on questions of the Middle East conflict, the EU generally takes a view that is more critical of Israel and more supportive of the Palestinians than the US. As regards the budget and financing of the UN, the EU seeks to maintain the functioning of the UN and its secretariat, and opposes budget cuts which it regards as too drastic.
Voting of the EU Member States in the General Assembly has also become largely unanimous. In the years 1995 to 2001, the degree of cohesion with regard to resolutions put to a vote fluctuated between 70 and 85 per cent. 71 There are, however, crucial areas of disagreement -the Middle East Conflict, in particular the questions of Palestine and Israeli human rights violations, nuclear weapons and disarmament (with mainly the two nuclear powers, UK und France, disagreeing with the other EU states), and decolonization. 72 In addition, agreement could not be reached on the issue of Security Council reform. 73 In the EU of 15, the strongest voting cohesion was achieved by the Benelux countries, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Finland and Greece, immediately followed by Austria, Sweden, Spain and Italy. 74 The European Commission recently described the negative effects of this situation as follows: 'Votes in which the EU is unable to agree on a common line continue to occur, mainly on issues in the area of CFSP. While in the past the practical implications of such split votes have generally been marginal, their impact on the EU's credibility is disproportionate -particularly in cases where there are established CFSP Common Positions on the issues in question.' 75 While EU cooperation in matters of the General Assembly thus works well, the same cannot be said for the Security Council. Respective efforts suffered a serious setback in the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 when the EU states represented on the Council positioned themselves in antagonistic groups (the UK and Spain, supporting the US-led war, on the one side, and France and Germany, opposing the war, on the other). A report of the German Government attributes the more limited degree of coordination and harmonization of EU Member State policies in the Security Council to 'the specific role of the Council in the UN system'.
76 This is a fine way of pointing to the fact that, See Sucharipa, supra note 9, at 783 and 797 (table) .
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See infra text accompanying note 106.
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See Sucharipa, supra note 9, at 784.
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See The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 4.
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See Report of the Federal Government about the Cooperation between Germany and the United Nations in 2001, at 6 (quoted in Sucharipa, supra note 9, at 788 n. 22).
unlike the General Assembly, the Council is entitled to make binding decisions, in particular under Chapter VII of the Charter. In other words, what the Council does really matters, whereas agreement in the Assembly is of relatively little political, and almost no legal, consequence. Structurally, an important difference between cooperation in the General Assembly and the Security Council lies in the fact that all EU members are members of the Assembly, and are so on the basis of equality. In contrast, EU membership in the Security Council is characterized by a fundamental difference of status between the two permanent members, the UK and France, on the one hand, and the other (usually two) 77 non-permanent EU members on the other hand, the latter only being elected for a term of two years and not eligible for immediate re-election (Article 23(2) of the UN Charter) and lacking the extraordinary power given to the P-5 by the right of veto (Article 27(3)). The United Kingdom and France continue to perceive their respective position as permanent member as being 'national' in the sense that a promotion of national interests is given priority over action as an 'agent for Europe'. Article 19(2) of the Treaty on European Union acknowledges this with the proviso 'without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter'.
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In recent years, the EU Presidency has made declarations in the Security Council on behalf of the EU Member States, and occasionally the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, has spoken before the Council, but these appearances are largely ceremonial and cannot be regarded as active forms of participation. It is also important to note that in the so-called informal consultations of the Security Council, in which the decisive part of the Council's work is done, the EU as such does not appear at all.
The European Commission cautiously addressed the shortcomings in the implementation of Article 19(2) of the TEU when it suggested that 'EU Member States in the Security Council, and notably the Union's two permanent members, should explore more systematic ways of fulfilling their commitments . . . Where there is a common EU position on an issue under discussion, this could involve the permanent members ensuring that one of them (in turns) explicitly presents that position'. 79 A franker appraisal was recently made by an academic observer: 'The status of France and the UK in the Security Council presents a greater challenge to European foreign and defense policy construction than do their occasional differences of substantive view, however sharp. When they cohere on Council business, as they often do on African issues, they are hard to oppose, even by the United States. 
The Future Place and Role of Europe in the United Nations
With the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia to the European Union in May 2004, Europe is almost united in the United Nations, for the first time in its history. A few European states still do not belong to the EU, but they are either on the road to membership (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Turkey) or tied to the EU in the framework of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) or by bilateral treaties (Switzerland). 81 The great East-West divide has been overcome.
A Europe in the System of Regional Groups
The system of regional groups in the UN, which reflected the post-World War II division of Europe, has not been fundamentally reformed after 1990. It primarily serves to prepare elections in important UN bodies, in particular the General Assembly. Before formal elections take place, the members of a regional group reach an agreement on which of them will be nominated and supported. Decisions in the regional groups are taken in accordance with the principle of consensus. As a rule, and on the basis of reciprocity, candidates endorsed by a group are subsequently elected. States, and Bulgaria and Romania as states with which the EU has entered into negotiations on accession. Since the mid-1990s, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have increasingly aligned themselves with WEOG in their statements in the UN General Assembly. 85 Recently, a number of proposals for a new system of regional groups have been put forward, 86 but none of them seeks to create a single European group. The so-called Razali plan of 1997 for a reform of the Security Council was also based on the existing scheme of groups. 87 Since the distribution of non-permanent seats in the Security Council is determined by this scheme, 88 no reorganization of the groups will take place until a general agreement about the Security Council reform is achieved. It is unclear whether such a reorganization is in the interest of the European states because it will probably result in a less favourable geographical distribution of seats for Europe as a whole than the present one. For the time being, the EU will be the most important bridge between WEOG and EES. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
B The Future Place of the European Union in the UN
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations, which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. In comparison to the text of this article as adopted by the European Convention, 90 the Intergovernmental Conference introduced a change in subparagraph 1 which can easily be overlooked: The IGC replaced the phrase 'respect . . . for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' with the words 'respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law'. The new wording seemingly enhances the importance of the UN Charter by mentioning it in the first place. But actually the Charter is depreciated in the new phrase because it is placed on the same level with 'international law'. The 'principles of the United Nations Charter' and 'international law' (or 'the principles of international law'?) are put side by side, as if they were equal in rank. The phrase reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the UN Charter's place and meaning in the international legal order. It fails to recognize that the UN Charter, as the constitution of the international community, embraces all international law. 91 The Charter was not conceived of as one of many multilateral treaties operating within the framework of international law, but as the constitution of the international community within which international law would operate. Accordingly, there is no room for a category of 'general international law' existing independently beside the Charter. Instead, the UN Charter is the supporting frame of all international law and, at the same time, the highest layer in a hierarchy of norms of international law. 92 Constitutional rules which preceded the Charter have become a part of it, and they are subject to the relevant rules of interpretation and amendment. They are valid solely in the form the Charter has given them. New customary law which would amend, or derogate from, Charter law cannot come into being. The United States Government was right when it argued in the Nicaragua case that 'the provisions of the United Nations Charter . . . subsume and supervene related principles of customary and general international law'. 93 The UN Charter and (general or customary) international law cannot be played off against each other. Accordingly, the IGC's amendment of Article III-193 of the Draft Treaty is a regrettable step backwards. The phrase chosen by the European Convention, 'respect . . . for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' (or even better: 'respect . . . for international law in accordance with the United Nations Charter'), would have been preferable.
A similar tendency of the IGC to reduce emphasis on the UN Charter becomes apparent from an amendment of Article III-193, paragraph 2, of the Draft Treaty. As one of the objectives of the Union's common policies and actions in international relations, the Convention had determined 'to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 90 international security, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter'. 94 Instead, the IGC decided to say 'to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders'. 95 The additional references to the Helsinki Final Act 96 and the Charter of Paris 97 were taken from Article 11(1) of the Treaty on European Union as presently in force. 98 Probably the IGC wanted to emphasize specifically 'European' principles and aims. However, both the Final Act and the Paris Charter are legally non-binding (which in the final clauses of both texts was expressed by the phrase that the Act and the Charter, respectively, 'is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations'). The European Union is of course free to orient its foreign policy to all sorts of principles, objectives and aims, but it is inappropriate to equate the binding rules of the UN Charter with pronouncements in political declarations, especially in the field of principal responsibility of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security.
The Draft Constitutional Treaty did not alter very much the provisions of the present Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union 99 on the coordination of foreign policy action in international organizations, including the UN. 100 The role of the new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is emphasized by a new provision according to which the Minister shall organize the coordination of actions of Member States in international organisations and at international conferences (Article III-206(1), second sentence). EU Member States which are also members of the UN Security Council shall concert and keep the other Member States and the Union Minister fully informed (Article III-206(2), subpara. 2). The following subparagraph 3 was added to paragraph 2: 'When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union's position.' also very questionable whether the responsibilities inherent in such a seat could be carried out in an effective way, or whether in contrast the EU would be forced into a policy of permanent abstention. If a common EU seat is created in the Security Council, it would be difficult to explain why in the General Assembly, ECOSOC and other UN bodies, the European Union should have 25 seats. On the other hand, exchanging the present 25 votes of EU Member States in those bodies for just one vote would severely diminish European influence in the United Nations, notwithstanding the example of the United States which is a powerful actor in the Organization in spite of its having just one vote.
Apart from these political questions, there are also serious legal obstacles to a European Union seat in the Security Council. The UN Charter only provides for membership of (sovereign) states (Article 4). The Security Council consists of 15 Member States (Article 23(1). The rules of Article 9 (the General Assembly shall consist of all the members of the UN) and Article 18(1) (each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote) do not allow states to retain their individual UN membership while uniting their seats and voting power in the organs of the Organization. From this it follows that as long as the EU is not a (sovereign) state it can neither become a member of the UN nor assume a seat in the Security Council, without a respective amendment of the UN Charter. 110 And such an amendment is unlikely to be accepted in the foreseeable future, if only for the reason that other groups of states (such as the Organization of American States, the African Union, or the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States) would claim similar privileges.
In a communication of September 2003, the European Commission diplomatically spoke of 'substantial challenges remain [ing] for the EU if it is to fulfil its potential in the UN'. 111 The Commission further stated: 'While the EU has moved progressively towards speaking with a common voice in UN debates, its real influence -and its ability to project European values -on the world stage still falls short of its economic and combined political weight '. 112 This is a fair description of the present situation -a situation which most likely will last in the years to come. In small steps, EU Member States will increasingly try to act in concert in the UN, and to make their unity visible by allowing EU representatives to take the floor in New York and Geneva. At the same time, EU states will individually remain members of the UN and, as such, will continue to be international actors in their own right.
Conclusion
Some 50 years have passed since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. This period was not only an extraordinarily good time for the countries of (Western) Europe, but also a time in which, all in all, Europe was a positive 110 The European Parliament failed to notice this fact when it claimed for the EU a permanent seat in the Security Council 'as soon as its [the EU's] legal personality is recognised' (see the resolution of 29 Jan. 2004, supra note 7, para. 12). International legal personality and 'sovereign' statehood are not the same. 111 See The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 3. 112 Ibid.
force in the United Nations, its support of the principles and purposes of the UN clearly outweighing the questionable aspects of its political and military action. A steady economic growth, the success of the democratic form of government, the strong military presence of the United States and the integration of the European armed forces in NATO, the threat to the independence and freedom of all Western European states posed by the Soviet Union -all these factors favourably contributed to a situation in Western Europe characterized by a general respect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations as defined by the Charter. The success of Western European economic and political integration was so obvious that, after the breakdown of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe, the peoples there immediately sought to join the European Union.
However, in recent years clouds have begun to darken the clear Union sky. Economic stagnation and cuts in social security benefits made necessary by very large national debts could be harbingers of a greater economic crisis which could not fail to have an impact on a political stability largely based on the expectation of 'more wealth for all'. It will be a challenge to maintain, under so much more difficult conditions, democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Europe, and to continue a policy of goodwill and solidarity towards the world at large, in accordance with the guiding ideas of the UN Charter.
'The European Union's commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy. ' 113 This statement of the European Commission also applies to the foreign policy of the individual European states. As neither international anarchy nor a hegemonic world order are desirable or realistic alternatives, Europe has no other choice but to remain loyal to the idea of a multilateral international system based on the principle that all states 'have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community', and that 'each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems'. 114 So far no other equally convincing -and equally universally accepted -guiding idea of international relations has appeared.
But, as the European Commission rightly remarked, the tests we face to keep this multilateral system and its institutions standing are bound to multiply, not diminish. 'In the years ahead, therefore, Europe's attachment to multilateralism -and to the United Nations, as the pivot of the multilateral system -will help determine whether, and how, the institutional architecture established in the years after World War II can continue to serve as the bedrock of the international system.' 115 Since the EC/EU and the global multilateral order of the UN are based on the same idea of 'integration through law' 116 and, more fundamentally, the same belief in rational and enlightened human beings able to design and organize their societal life in a reasonable way, a failure of multilateralism on a global level would necessarily have 113 See The European Union and the United Nations, supra note 6, at 3. 114 repercussions on the European project. Intellectually and conceptually, the European Union and the United Nations are built on the same foundations. If this ground becomes shaky, both structures are in danger. Equally, the European Union would get into serious trouble if as an international actor it stopped being faithful to the values which are its own spiritual foundation. This is the true reason why the EU, as long as it retains its identity, cannot engage in selfish power politics, a diplomacy of coercion, or military interventions contrary to international law.
